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SOS : Smart On Smart is a project funded by the "Agence
Nationale pour la Recherche” : ANR-07-SESU-014 and
supported by SCS cluster
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Purpose
Propose an innovative secure system architecture for embedded
device such as smart card and prove it.
An innovative secure system architecture to :
Help the design of the security strategy
Improve the smartness of the security strategy
Reconcile availability with security
Improve the performance




















SECURITY STRATEGY + DATA PROCESSING



















SECURITY STRATEGY + DATA PROCESSING
SPLIT OFF






















DATA PROCESSING SECURITY STRATEGY








Regroup all the security management under the responsibility of
an unique entity
Security policy more flexible, adaptable
Opportunity to design a smarter security policy
Fault attacks path more complex→ increase the security level
Improve the performance→ 2 systems running in parallel
Fit the initial main objectives
Drawbacks
Impact on the cost
New concept→ new paths for attack ?








Practical approach to test the concept
Prove it
How ?
Choose an application requiring different security levels and
performance→ pay tv
Conditional Access System :
Principle : digital audio/video stream can be unscrambled if the
right is owned by the smart-card.
3 main classes of command are used by the CAS :
Subscription management (keys & rights writing) : Very sensitive
Unscrambling (generating a control word) : Sensitive
Subscriber operations (parental control) : Not very sensitive







The challenge : availability versus security








































1 App requests to the VM a security level
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2 VM forwards the request to AS




















1 App requests to the VM a security level
2 VM forwards the request to AS
3 Depending on current context & request AS computes
the actions to perform.




















1 App requests to the VM a security level
2 VM forwards the request to AS
3 Depending on current context & request AS computes
the actions to perform.
4 AS could decide to parameter some hardware CMs




















1 App requests to the VM a security level
2 VM forwards the request to AS
3 Depending on current context & request AS computes
the actions to perform.
4 AS could decide to parameter some hardware CMs
5 AS could also ask to VM to apply software CMs.




















1 App requests to the VM a security level
2 VM forwards the request to AS
3 Depending on current context & request AS computes
the actions to perform.
4 AS could decide to parameter some hardware CMs
5 AS could also ask to VM to apply software CMs.
6 AS resumes the execution




















1 A sensor event occurs
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1 A sensor event occurs
2 An interruption is raised on HS and AS through the ICU
3 Depending on current context AS computes the actions
to perform.
4 AS could decide to parameter some hardware CMs
5 AS waits for HS interruption ack
6 AS clears the interruption
7 AS could also asks to VM to apply software CMs and
resumes the execution



















Follows the basic rule of SOS : “Split off”
Sensitive data are processed by the Host System⇒ HS embeds CMs
Security is under the control of the Audit System⇒ AS controls CMs
Rem : To demonstrate SOS concept⇒ chose hardware CMs that are
parametrable, switchable, and have an impact on cpu performance
Hardware interface
4KB dedicated to map CMs registers into memory space of AS
A control register : on/off + parameter
A status register
Interrupts from the sensors into the Host system are routed to the
Interrupt Control Unit of the Audit system






ALU protection against fault attacks
Principle
Based on Idle Hardware : ALU = ∑ Functional Units (Adder,
multiplier, shifter)⇒ Time redundancy
if optypeA 6= optypeB then
Recompute A and in parallel, Execute B
else
Stall the processor and Recompute A
end if


















ALU protection against fault attacks : Results
% instructions using ALU Scheduling improvement
Hardware overhead
Number of Slices Max Clock Period (ns)
Base ALU 2146 1.050
Fault tolerant ALU 2584 1.056
(+20.4%) (+0.57%)







A command register programmable by the Audit System
Based on : Injecting random instructions at random places during the
execution [Smart Random Code Injection to Mask Power Analysis Based Side Channel Attacks, Jude Angelo
Ambrose, University of New South Wales Sydney, Australia]
Setting and clearing a flag delimit the block frame to protect
SET_FLAG : starts to generate random instructions
N : the maximum number of random instructions injected between
two regular instructions
D : the maximum number of regular instructions skipped
RESET_FLAG : stops the injection of random instructions







A command register programmable by the Audit System
Based on : Injecting random instructions at random places during the
execution [Smart Random Code Injection to Mask Power Analysis Based Side Channel Attacks, Jude Angelo
Ambrose, University of New South Wales Sydney, Australia]
Setting and clearing a flag delimit the block frame to protect
SET_FLAG : starts to generate random instructions
N : the maximum number of random instructions injected between
two regular instructions
D : the maximum number of regular instructions skipped
RESET_FLAG : stops the injection of random instructions
Limitation of random instruction set
random register combined with zero register result written back to same random register : ADD $3, $3, $0






Random Instruction Injection : Implementation
Issue
if the injected instruction uses a register containing a sensitive data→
ր leakage information






Random Instruction Injection : Implementation
Issue
if the injected instruction uses a register containing a sensitive data→
ր leakage information
Solution
Use 2 register files : the main register file M and the register file R with
random values
Inject a random instruction using operands of R
example
ADD R5,R3,R0→ normal instruction
ADD R5,R7,R8→ random instruction






Random Instruction Injection : Results
Trivial DPA on VCDs without CM
Trivial DPA on VCDs with CM
Hardware overhead
Slices reg Slices LUT used as logic used as ram Max Clock Period (ns)
RII 2367 4568 4546 22 5.6ns
RII 3625 5413 5391 22 7 ns
53% 18% 18% 0%


























The security policy is tested using hardware emulation for fault
injection
⇒ rules improvement


















SOS to be continued...
Security Policy
The project finishes at the end of 2010.
The basic framework to build a smarter security is already
available.
Implementation for different applications is possible.
These new implementations will help us to improve and validate
the concept
Performance
The main concern of the first implementation of the
communication protocol is the security policy in spite of the
performance
So there are opportunities to exploit the parallelism of the
architecture and to reveal the performance
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